Stefano Pagliari

Stefano Pagliari

Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy

City, University of London

Research Interests

1. Political Economy of Financial Regulation

  1. Political Economy of Financial Regulation

My research has explored the drivers of financial regulatory reforms, with a particular emphasis on the reforms triggered by the global financial crisis at the international level, as well as within the US and EU.

2. Financial Industry and the Interest Ecology of Finance

  1. Financial Industry and the Interest Ecology of Finance

My research investigates the patterns of cooperation and conflict within the financial industry, as well as between finance and other groups that mobilize around the design of regulatory policies.

3. International Financial Institutions

  1. International Financial Institutions

My research has investigated the role and drivers of different international financial institutions such as the Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund.

4. Accountability after Financial Crises

  1. Accountability after Financial Crises

The research with Iosif Kovras (University of Cyprus) explores the policies responses introduced after the financial crisis by national authorities and international financial institutioins to hold individuals accountable for illegal or unethical behaviors associated with the global financial crisis.

5. Text as Data

  1. Text as Data

In my research I have explored new ways to leverage text-as-data approaches to investigate substantive political economy questions.

Journal Articles

see all publications

(2020). Exploring Information Exchange among Interest Groups: A Text-Reuse Approach. Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 7, Issue 11, pp.1698-1717, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1817132.

PDF Journal HTML

(2020). Crisis and Punishment? Explaining Politicians’ Appetite for Retribution in Post-Crisis Europe. Comparative Politics, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp. 595-615, DOI: 10.5129/001041521X16026878142074.

PDF Journal

(2019). Beyond financial repression and regulatory capture: the recomposition of European financial ecosystems after the crisis. Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 2019/4, n. 229, pp 14-33. Earlier version published as LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper No. 147/2019, and Bruegel Working Paper, 2014-08.

PDF (English) Journal (French) LSE Working Paper (English) Bruegel Working Paper (English)

(2018). The Financialization of Policy Preferences: Financial Asset Ownership, Regulation and Crisis Management. Socio-Economic Review, Volume 18, Issue 3, July 2020, Pages 655–680, DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwy027, Awarded the 2020 SER Best Article Prize.

PDF Journal

(2017). Capital United? Business Unity in Regulatory Politics and the Special Place of Finance. Regulation & Governance, Volume 11, Issue 1, March, Pages 3-23, DOI: 10.1111/rego.12098w.

PDF Journal

(2015). Financial Industry Power and Regulatory Policies: What Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis?. Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche (The Italian Journal of Public Policy), Volume 2, August, Pages 209–232, DOI: 10.1483/80632.

PDF Journal

(2014). Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, Volume 21, Issue 3, pages 575-610.

PDF Journal

(2011). The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda. International Organization, Volume 65, Issue 1, January, 2011, pp. 169–200, DOI: 10.1017/S0020818310000305.

PDF Journal

(2009). Towards a New Bretton Woods? The First G20 Leaders Summit and the Regulation of Global Finance. New Political Economy, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp. 169–200, DOI: 10.1017/S0020818310000305.

PDF Journal

Book Chapters

see all publications

(2019). How Financialization is Reproduced Politically. Chapter included in the volume “The Routledge International Handbook of Financialization”, edited by Phil Mader, Daniel Mertens, and Natascha van der Zwan, London: Routledge 2020.

PDF Book

(2012). Mitigating Capture in Financial Regulation. Chapter included in the volume “Making Good Financial Regulation. Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture”, edited by Stefano Pagliari, London: International Centre for Financial Regulation, 2012.

PDF

(2012). Who Mobilizes? An Analysis of Stakeholder Responses to Financial Policy Consultations. Chapter included in the volume “Making Good Financial Regulation. Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture”, edited by Stefano Pagliari, London: International Centre for Financial Regulation, 2012.

PDF

(2010). Between the Storms: Patterns in Global Financial Governance, 2001-07. Chapter included in the volume “Global Financial Integration Thirty years on. From Reform to Crisis”, edited by Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, Jasper Blom and Daniel Mügge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

PDF Book

(2010). Crisis and the Reform of International Financial Regulation. Chapter included in the volume “Global Finance in Crisis. The Politics of International Regulatory Change”, edited by Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, Hubert Zimmermann, Routledge, 2010.

PDF Book

Other Publications

see all publications

(2017). Financial Regulatory Arbitrage after Brexit: How Feasible?. Paper included in the Report ‘A Singapore on the Thames? Post-Brexit Deregulation in the UK’, CITYPERC, City, University of London.

PDF

(2013). Regulating Finance. The Political Economy of Unfinished Reform. World Politics Review. Feature Report ‘After the Fall: The Policy Legacy of the Global Financial Crisis’.

Website

(2013). Public Salience and International Financial Regulation. Explaining the International Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Rating Agencies, and Hedge Funds. A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Global Governance, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2013.

PDF

(2009). Limiting Systemic Risks, New Principles for Regulation. Paper prepared for Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik Forum theme on ‘Lessons from the financial crisis: On the need to change financial market rules to limit systematic risks’.

PDF

Contact